

CONFIDENTIAL

London Bureau

8 April 1948

Chief, FBIB

Free Greece Radio

1. The enclosed is a sample of weekly reports which the AMA GREENSH has been submitting to ID here in Washington, apparently compiled from local monitoring in Athens.
2. CIA has suggested to ID that such reports are unnecessary because of the complete coverage which FBIB gives to the Free Greece radio in its Daily Reports. It is therefore necessary that FBIB make certain that its coverage of this source is complete.
3. Please make a point to request Mediterranean Bureau coverage immediately if HBC coverage should be discontinued or become spotty, and please alert your editors to file all significant material to Washington.
4. In order to check FBIB's past performance in this regard, please check your files and report by teletype whether the three laws carried in the enclosed AMA report were transmitted textually to Washington at the time. This documentary material is the kind of thing which is of particular value to recipients of FBIB reports, especially when the source is as exclusive as in this case.

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L. K. WHITE

Enclosure

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April 8, 1948

Chairman, Projects Review Committee
THRU : Executive for A & M
Assistant Director for Operations

FBIB Exploitation of Press Transmissions via Radio Teletype

1. FBIB intercepts foreign press agency transmissions and correspondents' dispatches transmitted by radio in International Morse code. This material, excerpted into the FBIB Daily Report (Restricted) is a prompt source for items of information not immediately available elsewhere.

2. During the past two years there has been some movement of this material out of the morse medium into various systems of radio teletype, the most prevalent of which is the standard five-unit Baudet code. Interception of Baudet code requires equipment which FBIB does not use for other operations.

3. Although it is impossible to estimate accurately the value of the Baudet material available at this time, indications are that experimental interception at the two FBIB continental stations would be advisable. It is recommended that facilities be provided the FBIB East Coast and West Coast Bureaus to intercept at either location two simultaneous Baudet transmissions.

4. Requirements are as follows:

- a. Additional personnel: none.
- b. Time required for implementation: sixty days.
- c. Funds: vouchered, not to exceed \$15,000 for purchase, shipment and installation of equipment listed in attachments.

EDWIN L. SIMERT
Brigadier General, USA

STAT

Concur:

15/
Chief, Services Branch

15/
Chief, Communications Branch

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Attachment

cc: 7-Projects Review
1-Exec. for A & M
2-JO
1-Chief, Services
1-Chief, Communications

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ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT REQUIRED BY FEIS
FOR INTERCEPTION OF BAUDOT CODE

<u>Item</u>	<u>Approximate Cost</u>	
1. East Coast Bureau		
2 Northern Radio Converters	\$1,000	
2 Model 15 Teletype Machines	2,000	
1 Model 14 Typing Reporforater	1,000	
		\$ 4,000
2. West Coast Bureau		
2 Northern Radio Converters	1,000	
2 Model 15 Teletype Machines	2,000	
1 Model 14 Typing Reporforater	1,000	
2 Navy RBC Receivers, range 4 to 27 MC	3,000	
1 Navy Rack for RBC Receivers	250	
		\$ 7,250
3. Shipping, installation, contingencies		\$ 3,000
TOTAL		\$14,250.00

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Director of Central Intelligence

8 April 1948

Assistant Director for Operations

Minutes of Meeting of Projects Review Committee, 22 March 1948
-Project 00-23

1. After careful review of subject minutes, the undersigned feels obliged to make of record certain exceptions taken thereto in the interest of correcting what may develop into serious misconceptions.

2. Under V. Discussion, General Wright noted "...that the Meseda project had far exceeded, both in time and cost, original estimates." It is observed that:

a. Meseda project estimates were made and submitted jointly by representatives of the Office of Operations and the Services Branch.

b. The excess of ultimate expenditures over original estimates may be attributed to three primary causes in the following order of importance:

1. Decision to put construction into the hands of the Army Engineers.

2. Inadequate original estimates of equipment costs.

3. Additions to the original list of requirements made upon determination that adequate funds were available which might not be available at a later date.

c. The Office of Operations was without recourse to prevent delay in completion of the project after responsibility for construction was placed in the hands of the Army Engineers.

3. In the third subparagraph under V. Discussion, "The Cyprus project was also cited by General Wright as an example of unforeseen delay, additional costs and complications." It is observed in this case also that:

a. Original estimates were made jointly by representatives of OO and Services Branch.

b. Additional costs are, for the most part, attributable to the decision to place construction in the hands of the Army Engineers.

c. Unforeseen delays have not occurred to date in connection with the Cyprus project.

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4. The final sentences of subparagraph "4" under V. Discussion, "Members felt this (Army Engineer overhead) was excessive but probably must be accepted in view of the importance of the project." The view of members of my office and of FBIB was not that this procedure must necessarily be accepted.

5. In the third from the last paragraph under V. Discussion, "Representatives of the Office of Operations reported on the probable costs of CIA operated communications. These were agreed excessive." This is apparently a misunderstanding. CIA operated communications, while entailing an initial expenditure for installation, would entail a relatively minor operating expense, particularly as compared to the cost for commercial transmission of copy. For this reason it is believed unwise to approve this project contingent only upon obtaining "...guarantees from the Signal Corps that the problem of handling communications will be undertaken by them." If such a guarantee is not obtainable it is recommended that CIA operated communications be given further consideration.

EDWIN L. SIBERT
Brigadier General, U.S.A.

OO/PB
LKW/at

cc: Orig & 1 addressee
OO - 2
Return FBIB - 1

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